Gateshead Council

HOUSING, ENVIRONMENT &
HEALTHY COMMUNITIES OSC
11 September 2023

TITLE OF REPORT: The Impact of Brexit on Businesses Large and Small

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Purpose of the Report

1. To update, and seek the views of, the Housing, Environment and Healthy Communities OSC regarding the ongoing impact of Brexit on businesses large and small in Gateshead and the North East.

Introduction

2. Vigorous debate continues about the consequences of Brexit for businesses large and small. Formulating a clear picture is difficult because other seismic events have had a distortive effect on the economy recently. This makes unpicking Brexit-related impacts on businesses particularly complicated. Moreover, the exit process is ongoing and our business and economic relationship with the EU will evolve over time. Evidence of the impact will emerge gradually, informing our analysis and understanding of issues affecting both local businesses and the council.

3. Throughout, Gateshead Council has continued to work collaboratively with local and regional partners to:
   - Gather intelligence, understand, and monitor the impact of these changes for businesses,
   - support businesses to navigate the EU Exit transition period,
   - build business resilience to adapt successfully to a post Brexit economy, and,
   - continue investing in the local economy to ensure businesses, the workforce and residents thrive.

Background

4. Businesses in Gateshead are inevitably influenced by conditions affecting the UK and global economy. The outlook for growth and prosperity has a distinct local dimension, therefore it is important to understand and contextualise the effect of wider trends on the borough.

5. While Brexit is identified as a long-term structural change to the economy, assessing its ongoing impact is complex for several reasons:
   - Firstly, it is impossible to know how the economy would have performed had the UK remained in the EU. Nonetheless, the UK economy is smaller and has grown more slowly since the pandemic. Plausibly, Brexit is a contributory factor, amongst others.
   - Secondly, a confluence of external shocks, such as the pandemic and global conflict, coupled with price increases, inflation, and labour shortages make it difficult to distinguish and isolate the effects of EU withdrawal on local businesses. However, the possibility should be acknowledged alongside other apparent issues.

- Thirdly, not all the datasets are available for interpretation at local authority level, but examination of objective economic analysis provides an insight into the impact of Brexit.

6. A previous committee report focused on the build up to and immediate reaction of local businesses to EU withdrawal. This update turns to the medium-term implications and impacts since leaving the EU. Information presented draws on the best available data and intelligence that is pertinent to Gateshead. Local statistics are provided wherever possible.

Economic Outlook and Growth

National Economic Forecasts

7. The Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR), the UK's independent economic forecaster, projects UK imports and exports will be 15% lower in the long run compared with remaining in the EU. [i]A review of its forecast in March 2023 revealed that trends in UK trade supported this view. Productivity, therefore, growth, was predicted to be 4% lower. The economy was expected to grow by a smaller amount than it would have done due to the UK trading less outside the EU.[ii] .

8. Similarly, the Bank of England thinks that Brexit is likely to lower productivity by 3.75% due to a reduction in trade with the EU.[iii] Some think tanks estimate higher losses with GDP falling 5.5%, investment declining by 11% and a 7% decrease in traded goods.[iv]

9. A report by the Resolution Foundation in June 2022[v] assessed the long-term impacts of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) on business investment, trade flows, productivity, sectors, and regions in the UK. The findings highlighted the North East's disproportionate exposure to changes in trade with the EU, projecting that manufacturing output would fall 2.7%, together with professional and financial services by 4.1% and 4% respectively.

10. Not all economists share such a pessimistic view. Some point to limited data or the absence of a sudden, major fall in UK exports as evidence that the immediate effects have been less damaging than commentators may have feared.

Actual Regional and Local Economic Impacts

11. Analysis of GDP[vi] by the North East Local Enterprise Partnership (NELEP) demonstrates how the local and regional economy has actually performed in the period before, during and after EU exit.[vii]

12. North East GDP in 2021 was about twice what it was in 1998, the first year of the dataset. The latest totals in England and England excluding London were 2.3 and 2.2 times higher than in 1998. The difference in growth rates was more noticeable during the second half of this period.

13. The latest North East GDP total was about 2.5% of the England equivalent or 3.4% if London is excluded. These proportions have decreased during the most recent decade.

14. In 2021, North East GDP was 7.7% higher than a year earlier. This was a slightly lower increase than in England excluding London (up 7.9%). However, the latest year increase was insufficient to match pre-pandemic levels.

15. North East GDP was 0.1% lower in 2021 compared to 2019, unlike the total for England, which had grown during the same period.

16. By contrast, between 2019 and 2021, GDP in Gateshead had fallen by 2.08%.

17. Real GDP per head is a statistic that allows changes in GDP over time to be measured with the effects of population change and inflation removed. Growth in real GDP per head over the decade (2014-21) was lower in the North East than other parts of the UK and had decreased in Gateshead (-£897).

18. In 2021 GDP per head in Gateshead was £26,335, higher than the North East figure of £24,738.

19. NELEP has also analysed how various sectors contributed to economic output in different areas, including Gateshead[viii] . Compared with England excluding London, a higher share of GVA in the North East is produced by manufacturing. Generally, the data shows that manufacturing, retail and accommodation in Gateshead recovered strongly in 2020-21 except food, drink, textiles and clothing manufacturing, which fell. [ix]

20. Anecdotally, Gateshead Council's Strategic Account Management (SAM) service reports that whilst firms have not explicitly raised Brexit as a concern, the additional costs of trade with the EU are now built into business models. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to separate the impact of Brexit from other challenges posed by the pandemic, war in Ukraine, skilled labour shortages and price inflation.

<u>Sectoral Impacts (NELEP report)</u>

21. Business exposure to the effects of Brexit differs according to size, scale, and sector. Throughout the process of leaving the EU, impacts have varied depending on the nature of changes to the regulatory and trading relationship between the UK and EU and their impact on different industries. Agriculture, food and drink, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing businesses all experienced disruption. Nearly half of North East businesses surveyed by NELEP adjusted their operating model because of Brexit, together with 39% of manufacturers.[x]

Changes to International Trade and Regulation

22. UK withdrawal from the EU Single Market and Customs Union in 2021 signified new rules, paperwork and border checks for companies trading with the EU, the North East's biggest market. To qualify for tariff and quota free trade, goods exported from the UK to the EU must comply with new legal and regulatory requirements. The EU introduced full customs and border controls on goods imported from the UK on 1 January 2021. These changes have impacted the ease and cost of international trade, and there are more yet to come.

23. Simultaneously, the introduction of full customs and border checks on goods imported to the UK from the EU was delayed. Government subsequently confirmed a staggered approach to implementation on the UK side of the border, allowing more time for agencies and businesses to prepare. This process is ongoing.

24. Anticipated future trade requirements include:
    - Export health certificates for agrifoods in October 2023

- The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) certifying the level of carbon in metallic goods such as steel, iron, aluminum and more. A phased rollout will begin in October 2023 before becoming fully operational in 2026
- Border checks for health certificates in February 2024
- Requirements for safety and security certificates in October 2024

Business Intelligence

25. To establish how businesses have fared under the new regime so far, in 2021, the North East EU Exit Implementation Group sought feedback on barriers to trade between the UK and EU. Businesses cited increased cost pressures, the need for logistical support and unequivocal guidance as critical issues.

Cost of Compliance

26. Businesses reported that the administration of new trade rules had increased costs and affected their competitiveness in EU and global markets. Some expressed concern about the loss of future sales.

27. Smaller firms were less likely to be aware of the changes and how to navigate them, whereas larger companies with more resources and export experience could adapt more easily.

Logistics

28. Warehousing, packaging, transport, and distribution costs, soared in 2020 due to new administrative requirements, a shortage of shipping containers, and supply chain disruption caused by a combination of Covid and Brexit. Many businesses highlighted delays in shipping or receiving goods, compounded by strict border controls enforceable between the UK and EU.

Government Guidance

29. In early 2020, businesses voiced frustration that guidance on new trading requirements was slow to be published, lacking clarity, or of limited practical use.

Survey Feedback

30. A national Federation of Small Business (FSB) survey[xi] showed almost a quarter of SME exporters (23%) had temporarily halted sales to EU customers and 4% decided to halt this activity altogether after the TCA was implemented in January 2021. Anecdotally, regional insights confirmed that many smaller businesses had since abandoned exporting to the EU permanently.

31. Make UK surveyed manufacturers in 2021, discovering that a third had experienced ongoing challenges with customs paperwork and procedures.[xii]

32. A North East Chamber of Commerce (NECC) survey in Spring 2021 found that 75% of members in the region had experienced difficulties trading in EU markets because of the TCA and 38% reported a reduction in sales to the EU.[xiii] Evidence submitted by the Chamber to the House of Commons International Trade Committee supported claims that smaller firms were likely to need additional support.

33. Underlying trade barriers and cost uplifts continue to affect businesses striving to recover from reduced cash flow and weakened balance sheets caused by Covid.

Early Effects on International Trade

34. A combination of EU Exit and a series of global economic shocks has seen UK trade with the rest of the world and EU fall relative to the size of the economy. Other nations are experiencing similar challenges, but UK trade continues to lag the G7, leading to speculation that Brexit could be an underlying factor.[xiv] Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain for certain whether the UK would have performed better had it not been for Brexit.

35. Historically, the North East has relied more heavily on trade with the EU compared to the rest of the world. Whilst this remains the case, trade with the EU has diminished somewhat following EU Exit and introduction of the TCA. Analysts considered this had contributed temporarily to a widening trade deficit seen in early 2022, which subsequently closed by the end of the year.

36. According to analysis by the NECC, regional export trends have followed the pattern observed in the UK in 2022. The value of exports, while having increased year on year, are still below pre-pandemic levels in 2019, although the trade deficit narrowed to £583m. [xv]

37. Conversely, imports have grown considerably over the last two years, representing an £821m increase on pre-pandemic figures. The EU remains the region's biggest single export and import market with 57% of all exports and 53% of imports traded in the bloc. Asia and Oceania, coupled with the USA are also significant trading partners for the North East. Although exports to Asia only account for 15% of North East trade, the region imports 27% of its goods from there. While other regions have either shown a decline or static imports into the North East, Asia and Oceania have continued to grow steadily year on year.

38. Exports from the North East increased by £1 billion between 2021 and 2022, reaching a total of £12.6 billion. Trade with the EU accounted for the majority of goods exported from the region (£7.2 billion of the North East total).

39. Recent trade data is encouraging in that the value of goods exported from the region is returning to pre-pandemic levels, however business groups believe there is still more work to be done. While the value of goods traded in and out of the region is increasing, the total number of internationally trading companies in the North East continues to decline. The North East has the lowest levels of international trade of all the UK regions. Several free trade agreements are due to be ratified in 2023; it is imperative the North East is positioned to access new markets, widening opportunities to stimulate local business growth and job creation.

40. NELEP analysis is consistent with these findings, although more cautious about the role of EU exit, given the anomalous and disproportionate impact of Covid on economic performance across a range of indicators during this period.

41. The total value of goods exports from the North East to the EU increased between the referendum in 2016 and 2019 but decreased in 2020 as the pandemic constrained business activity and international trade. Between 2016 and 2021, total North East goods exports to the EU fell by £552m (8%) while exports to non-EU countries increased by

£211m (4%) over the same time horizon. The proportion of North East goods exports to the EU fell from 61% of the total in 2016 to 60% in 2019 and 58% in 2021.[xvi]

42. The EU is still the largest trading partner for North East goods exports despite a small increase in the proportion of goods exported outside the EU. Although exports to the EU increased following implementation of the TCA in 2021, the impact of Covid on the 2020 figures means that further monitoring and analysis of the data is required to discern the long running effects of the TCA on regional international trade.

Impact on North East Service Exports

43. Latest regional data shows service exports from the North East were £1.1 billion lower in 2020 than in 2019, which represents a decline of 17%. This was the third largest decrease in England. [xvii]

44. The total value of service exports from the North East region in 2020 was £5.1 billion. This was the smallest total of the English regions and the North East also had lower exports per head than the Northern Powerhouse.

45. Total service exports from the North East were 8% lower in 2020 than in 2017, compared to 2% higher in the Northern Powerhouse in the same year.

46. Finance and insurance activities, and manufacturing both accounted for 29% of North East service exports in 2020. Manufacturing service exports from the North East increased by £146 million between 2019 and 2020, continuing a trend of growth. Whereas financial and insurance activities saw a significant -£651 million decrease in the same period.

47. Slightly more of North East service exports were to non-EU markets than EU markets in 2020 with the USA accounting for the largest share.

48. Both Non-EU and EU markets saw declines of a similar size in 2020 (19% and 16% respectively).

49. Mostly, these decreases have been attributed to the disruptive impact of Covid.

Business Investment and Access to Finance

50. Business investment in Research & Development, technology, training, property, and equipment can help to generate growth, raise productivity, and increase employment in the economy. Confidence to do so is affected by the UK's relationship with the EU. Since the referendum, there are signs that business appetite for investment has weakened. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that prolonged uncertainty surrounding Brexit and unresolved issues may have discouraged or delayed some forms of investment, but other business groups are sceptical about whether there is sufficient evidence to corroborate this assertion.

51. Also, companies may have diverted spending towards digital transformation and Covid safe working practices to continue trading through the pandemic, which is difficult to estimate or capture using traditional metrics.

52. Ongoing volatility continues to affect the economic climate and investment conditions for local businesses. Restoring stability and bolstering investor confidence is crucial to developing a more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient economy that enables local businesses and residents to thrive.

53. Currency valuation, or put simply, how much the British pound is worth relative to the US dollar, affects import and export costs for local business. It is a key factor driving price inflation nationally. In some respects, this is positive because a weaker pound against the dollar means the value of UK and therefore regional exports have gone up. The USA represents the second largest export market for the North East, opening the region to more foreign direct investment opportunities. However, most exporters are also importers of goods and materials from abroad. Import prices have increased due to poorer exchange rates, supply chain issues and rising inflation, offsetting the higher value of exports.

54. Escalating costs, price increases and high inflation all have a bearing on business investment decisions. Interest rate rises designed to control inflation also affect the availability of business loans and increase the cost of borrowing for business investment.

55. Labour (30%), materials (36%) and economic uncertainty (37%) are impacting business turnover, mirroring the same drivers of inflation across the UK.[xviii]

Foreign Direct Investment

56. In addition to international trade, EU Exit and the TCA has repercussions for foreign direct investment (FDI). Access to the EU Single Market has been an important driver of business investment and job creation in Gateshead, the North East and UK. The effect on FDI depends on:
    a) negotiating favourable trade agreements with the EU and other countries,
    b) nature of the regulatory environment affecting business operations in the UK

57. The number of jobs created by FDI projects in the North East decreased following the referendum in 2016. Conjecture suggests ambiguity surrounding the UK's future relationship with the EU may have dampened or delayed new foreign direct investment, at least initially. An uptick occurred in 2019-20 before the TCA was enacted, withdrawing the UK from the EU Single Market and Customs Union. This major legislative reform introduced significant changes in international trade for businesses and investors operating in global markets. Uncertainty persisted, exacerbated by the pandemic, contributing to a steep decline in FDI during 2020-21. However, since then, the North East has rebounded, benefiting from 59 new projects and 5495 jobs in 2021-22 compared to 60 projects and 4,609 jobs in 2016-17. [xix]

Global Trade and Future Competitiveness

58. Enhancing the international competitiveness of local businesses post Brexit is a key objective for Gateshead and the region. As the USA and EU invest heavily in re-industrialisation to grow economies and improve living standards across both continents, the UK will need to finance large-scale research, innovation, job creation and training. Ensuring the UK remains an attractive location for investment is vital for local businesses and communities to benefit from shifts in global trade.

59. New and emerging policy factors driving international trade are consistent with intelligence gathered by the NECC. Survey data showed a flattening of export sales in the aftermath of

economic shocks. Brexit, Covid, rising inflation, increased energy costs, skilled labour shortages, and different patterns of international migration are all influencing trade and investment. [xx]While sales remained comparatively subdued for UK companies, by contrast, export growth in other countries experienced a stronger recovery in the same period. Analysis of UK trade data by Deloitte found that UK export performance trailed Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and USA in late 2020 and 2021.[xxi]

60. More research is needed to understand the impact of EU Exit on the competitiveness of different industry sectors, and the TCA on regional and UK export performance.

Implications of New Trade Agreements

61. A total of 71 trade deals have been struck.[xxii] Most perpetuate UK-EU trade agreements until replacements can be negotiated. The UK has also signed deals with Australia and New Zealand, but the outcome of these agreements will take several years to materialise. Talks are underway with India and members of a trans-Pacific pact. However, trade deals with some of the world's largest economies, such as the US and China, remain elusive. Both the USA and China are important markets for North East inward investment and imports.

Legislative Changes

62. The LGA estimates that local authorities are responsible for implementing around 70% of EU legislation. [xxiii]Rules governing the legitimacy of state aid and procurement shape the way services for local businesses are funded, commissioned, and delivered.

Subsidy Control

63. Public bodies and companies, including Gateshead Council continue to seek legal advice on compliance with the new UK Subsidy Control rules that have replaced State Aid. The regime is complex to administer and continues protracting delivery of investment in the economy.

Funding for Local Economic Development and Regeneration

64. During a sustained period of austerity for local authorities that has seen budgets fall significantly, EU funding provided a mechanism to finance regeneration schemes, business and employment support for residents that would otherwise be difficult to afford. Securing an equivalent domestic replacement was therefore a key priority for Gateshead and the region following the EU referendum.

65. Government subsequently created the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) to replicate European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional Development Funds (ERDF)elements of EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF). First announced in 2017, details of the policy emerged gradually, but confirmation of a domestic successor fund and pivotal role for local councils was widely welcomed.

66. In 2021, Government piloted the UK Community Renewal Fund (CRF) as a stopgap measure until UKSPF could be rolled out nationally. Gateshead was a beneficiary of this investment.

67. UKSPF was launched in April 2022, which confirmed indicative funding for local areas, including £11,634,466 for Gateshead. A proportion of the UKSPF budget was also ring fenced to finance delivery of Multiply, a national adult numeracy programme.

68. Funding was contingent on the Council submitting an investment plan that took account of local priorities, evidence of need, stakeholder feedback and regional collaboration within a national framework, informed by input from a Local Partnership Group (LPG) and constituency MPs. The plan was submitted in July 2022, specifying how the money would be spent across three domains: local business, people and skills, and communities and place. It was approved for implementation in October 2022 and delivery plans are now being developed.

69. The total amount of funding available to the NELEP area will match ESF and ERDF allocations from the 2014-20 ESIF programme in 2024-25. In this respect, UKSPF broadly imitates its ESIF counterpart.

70. However, in 2022-23 and 2023-24, the North East will receive less money from UKSPF than had the region benefited from a continuous flow of ESIF investment without any breaks in funding or programme delivery. This is because ESIF funded business support provision ceases in 2023 before UKSPF can be fully deployed due to the delay in government approving spending plans. Places have lost the opportunity to bridge the gap between ESIF ending and UKSPF taking effect. As a result, business support providers are facing increased financial pressure, while councils seek to mitigate the impact of potential service disruption on local businesses.

71. Although UKSPF shares similar policy objectives to ESIF, control over spending priorities, delivery timeframes and resource allocations have changed. The UKSPF is not yet fully devolved to regions or local authorities as the parameters are set by central government. A shorter funding window, tight delivery timescales in 2022-23, and lack of clarity about the future of the fund post March 2025, means that strategic economic planning will remain challenging for local and combined authorities.

72. The timescale is particularly taxing for interventions in the first year of the programme (2022-23). Government has indicated that local authorities may carry forward underspends to the next financial year, provided revised delivery plans are approved. However currently no funding will be available for activity after March 2025, and any underspends in the final year of the programme (2024/25) will need to be repaid to the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC).

73. Furthermore, the replacement of EU Structural Funds for rural economic development, and funding from the Common Agricultural Policy for farming and environmental measures, are not included as part of the UKSPF. Government has advised that these will be addressed separately.

Labour Market

74. The North East has the lowest number and proportion of EU nationals of any UK region. Numbers of EU nationals employed in the North East (excluding self-employed) increased from 24,000 in June 2016 to 27,500 in June 2021. The number of non-EU nationals employed in the North East increased from 25,300 to 37,600 over the same period.[xxiv]

75. Growth in the number of non-UK, non-EU nationals employed in the North East has outpaced growth in the number of EU nationals since 2019. The factors contributing to this change could include an end to EU free movement, broader reforms to UK immigration policy, employment opportunities in EU countries, and the impact of the Covid pandemic on employment decisions.

76. In June 2021, non-UK national employments in the North East region were most likely to be in health and social work, accommodation and food services, or administrative and support services. However, for EU nationals, employments were most likely to be in manufacturing. EU nationals made up 4% of the total workforce in manufacturing.

77. By March 2023, there were 57,330 applications to the EU Settlement Scheme from the North East LEP area, including 7,850 from Gateshead, the third highest proportion across the LA, of which 6,130 applicants were of working age (16-64).[xxv]

78. Since agreement of the TCA and the end of free movement with the EU, North East businesses have reported challenges with the cost and administration of the points-based system for skilled workers, and visas for business travel in the EU.

79. Businesses frequently cite a shortage of skilled labour, exacerbated by higher rates of economic inactivity following the pandemic, as a constraint on growth.

80. The dual impact of Covid-19 and the end of free movement with the EU on the North East labour market and migration patterns will require ongoing monitoring and analysis as more data becomes available.

Employment rights

81. A large body of UK employment law is based on EU law. These obligations set a minimum threshold in the labour market below which standards should not fall. Employment protections have been expanded over time and transposed into domestic law to comply with obligations that emerged during EU Exit negotiations whilst the UK was still a member of the EU. It is unclear whether the government will pursue reform of employment law now the UK is outside the EU. Employers have not raised the issue of labour market deregulation and studies have shown economic performance is unaffected by current laws. The immediate priority for businesses is improving the supply of skilled labour to promote growth.

Conclusion

82. Businesses large and small across Gateshead have shown remarkable resilience, acclimating to economic volatility, and responding pragmatically to sweeping changes arising from Brexit. Maintaining a strong business support ecosystem is a key priority as the exit process continues to unfold. Business support is a fundamental part of the infrastructure required to retain existing firms, attract new investment, and generate job growth in the borough. The council will continue working collaboratively with partners, maximising the impact of post-EU funding in Gateshead to foster local business growth and provide opportunities for residents to thrive.

Recommendation

83. The Housing, Environment and Healthy Communities OSC is asked to note and comment on the findings of this report.

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[i] https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2022/
[ii] (The forecast considers the effect of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and other regulatory announcements up to March 2022)
[iii] https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy-report/2023/february-2023
[iv] https://www.cer.org.uk/insights/cost-brexit-june-2022
[v] https://economy2030.resolutionfoundation.org/reports/the-big-brexit/
[vi] The value of goods and services produced in the North East
[vii] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/gdp-lep-area

[viii] (GVA by industry)
[ix] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/gva-industry

[x] NE Growth Hub Monthly Survey, February 2021
[xi] https://www.fsb.org.uk/resources-page/one-in-four-small-exporters-halt-eu-sales-three-months-on-from-transition-end-new-study-finds.html
[xii] https://www.makeuk.org/insights/reports/trade-and-cooperation-with-the-eu-six-months-on
[xiii] https://www.neechamber.co.uk/chamber-survey-shows-devastating-impact-of-brexit-on-eu-trade/
[xiv] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-64450882
[xv] International Trade Statistics 2022, North East and UK, Chamber of Commerce
[xvi] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/trade-goods-value

[xvii] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/trade-services

[xviii] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/cost-of-doing-business
[xix] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/foreign-direct-investment
[xx] Economic Survey, Q1, 2023, NECC
[xxi] Deloitte: Why has the UK missed out on a trade boom?, May 2022
[xxii] As of September 2022
[xxiii] https://regions.regionalstudies.org/ezine/article/the-impact-of-brexit-on-english-local-government/?doi=10.1080/13673882.2018.00001049
[xxiv] https://evidencehub.northeastlep.co.uk/report/employment-by-nationality

1. [xxv] EU Settlement Scheme quarterly statistics, 28 August 2018 to 31 March 2023, (UK Home Office)